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ABSTRACT

It is commonly assumed that the
ACTU is the most important peak
union council in Australia, since it is
a national body, which has had no
serious rivals for fourteen years.
During the last decade its authority
and prestige have also expanded
dramatically, largely as a result of its
special relationship with the federal
ALP government, underwritten by the ‘
Accord in its various forms. However,
th is paper argues that the recent
period is an aberration, departing
from the historical norm, and unlikely
to be maintained in the long term. For
a num ber of h isto rical reasons
outlined here, the Labor Council of
New South Wales has been the main
instigator of industrial reform in
Australia.

AUTHOR

Ray Markey (1949) is Associate
Professor in Industrial Relations at
th e U niversity of W ollongong,
Australia. He is author of The Making
of the Labor Party in New South Wales
(K ensington, 1 988), I n d u s t r i a l
Democracy at Port Kembla (Canberra,
1988), and In Case of Oppression. The
Life and Times of the Labor Council of
NSW, (Pluto Press, Sydney, 1994). He
h as also published about forty
articles in Australian and comparative
labour history, technological change
and in d u stria l re la tio n s, and
industrial democracy. He has been a
c o n s u lta n t to th e A u stra lia n
Department of Industrial Relations,
the ILO, and a number of firms and
trade unions in Australia, Britain and
Yugoslavia, and is currently chairman
of th e In tern atio n al In d u strial
Relations Association Study Group on
Workers' Participation.

INTRODUCTION

It is commonly assumed that the ACTU is the most important
peak union council in Australia. However, this apparently
obvious assumption has rarely been tested in the literature of
labour history and industrial relations. Indeed, the literature
relating to the role of peak union councils in general has been
rather limited, and that which exists has been almost exclusively
devoted to the authority of the national peak council, the ACTU.
This is surprising because it has always been recognised that
the state labour councils were important in the formation and
operations of the ACTU, especially its pre-1947 activities. As
Gollan noted: 'the way in which the ACTU functioned left most
real authority in the hands of the individual unions and the state
trades and labour councils'1. The ACTU's then president, Albert
Monk, claimed at the 1940 Congress that 'in the early years it had
simply existed, and it would not have done so had it not been for
loans advanced by the Melbourne THC'2. Unlike the state labour
councils, the ACTU did not even have a full-time official until
1943.
From the Second World War onwards, the role of the ACTU in
Australian industrial relations and union affairs expanded, and
hence, it is largely this more recent period of ACTU history with
which most of the literature is concerned. In 1947 the state labour
councils finally renounced their veto power over ACTU Congress
decisions, which had been proposed by Congress since 1943.3
From the late 1950s Martin argued that the role and authority of
the ACTU had significantly increased since the 1940s to surpass
that of the TUC in Britain, even though the ACTU still lacked
substantial formal control over affiliates. Martin noted a growing
acceptance of ACTU authority in industrial disputes by
affiliates, particularly in key industries such as the waterfront
1

and mining, in co-ordinating public sector union claims, and in
formulating basic wage case submissions. The latter role virtually
ensured a place for the ACTU in industrial relations under a
centralised system of wage determination. But Martin also noted
the growth in union affiliations and incorporation of industry
groups of unions into the ACTU's structure as important
elements contributing to its enhanced authority.4
Other commentators on the ACTU's role in the 1950s were
less convinced of its emerging authority, particularly with regard
to industrial disputes.5 Nevertheless, Martin's interpretation was
influential until challenged by Dabscheck in 1977.6 From then
until the mid-1980s the general consensus was that the ACTU's
authority over affiliates is relatively weak.7 Subsequently, a new
consensus has developed that the ACTU's general authority has
increased dramatically, as a result of its absorption of ACSPA
and CAGEO from 1979 to 1981 to become the sole national peak
union council, and especially since 1983 as a result of the special
relationship between the ACTU and the ALP government
characterised by the various versions of the Accord.8
A notable omission in all of this literature remains the
comparison with the authority of state labour councils. It is still
simply assumed that the national peak body is more important. It
is not the purpose of this paper to evaluate the respective claims,
in themselves, in this literature over time, but to introduce a new
element of evaluation by comparison with the premier state peak
union council in Australia. In doing so, I have broadened the focus
away from the concept of authority to that of general significance
in affecting the industrial relations environment of Australia. I
employ three of M artin's yardsticks for evaluating relative
authority:
•

membership of affiliates, in aggregate and as a
proportion of all trade unionists and the workforce;
2

•

the industrial function of the peak body, in terms of its
role in bargaining and/or arbitration, controlling
industrial action, and intervening in demarcation
disputes between unions; and

•

the political function of the peak council.

A fourth yardstick employed by Martin refers to the structural
diffusion of power within the organisation, between the executive
and the affiliates, including the governmental powers exercised
over the affiliates. For the purposes of this article, I have
subsumed consideration of this under the yardstick relating to
industrial function, since this is where much of the literature has
concentrated when discussing internal diffusion of power.
However, I have added one extra yardstick derived from
Headey's check-list,9namely:
•

the level of resources, including staff, but especially
finances.

Historically, the argument in this article is largely based upon
the Labor Council's senior status amongst peak union councils in
Australia, the federal structure of industrial relations, and the
Labor Council’s close relationship with the most electorally
successful state branch of the ALP. The last section examines the
changes in industrial relations since 1983, and speculates on their
likely future impact on the relative significance of the Labor
Council of NSW and the ACTU.
ORIGINS

The Labor Council, founded in 1871 as the Trades and Labour
Council of Sydney, is the oldest peak union body in Australia,
3

and one of the oldest in the world. Its only possible rival as the
oldest Australian peak body is the Melbourne Trades Hall
Council, which was founded in 1856, but until 1883 it was
essentially a building management committee rather than a peak
council.10 The London Trades Council was the earliest English
peak body to be formed, in I860, and the English Trades Union
Congress began in 1868, only three years before the formation of
the Sydney TLC.11
The ACTU was not formed until 1927. Prior to then, on those
rare occasions when government needed to consult with
representatives of the union movement at a national level, the
Labor Council was one of the two principal bodies chosen,
usually with the Melbourne Trades Hall Council, and sometimes
with the AWU. All three were influential with the federal ALP, in
or out of government. Even for the Industrial Peace Conferences
called by the N ationalist federal governm ent in 1928-9,
immediately after the formation of the ACTU, the NSW and
M elbou rne Labor C ouncils w ere the prin cipal union
representatives.12
In the formation of the ACTU itself, the Labor Council was
arguably the single most important force. The earliest instance of
interstate or national union organisation were the seven
Intercolonial Trades Union Congresses of 1879-91. These were
initiated by the Sydney TLC when it organised the first of these
congresses in 1879 (and the third in 1885).13 The 1891 congress
formed the Australasian Labour Federation, but only in
Queensland and briefly NSW, did this become operational.14 In
1902 the Labor Council instigated the first, and in 1918 the
largest, of six Interstate Congresses of Trade Unions organised
between those two dates.15 These were succeeded by the four
All-Australian Trade Union Congresses of 1919, 1921, 1922, and
1926. The Labor Council played a major role in all of these
congresses, particularly in organising the early ones. Its secretary,
4

E. J. Kavanagh, was elected secretary of the first Federal Grand
Council of Labour, which was formed at the 1913 Congress.16
As w ith their nineteenth century predecessors, these
congresses were essentially discussion forums over industrial
grievances and political issues. But from the outset the
Congresses were interested in developing some form of national
labour federation, led by the Labor Council of NSW. From 1902
this idea was subject to various proposals and planning
refinements to give it effect. As might be expected, given the
momentum provided by the Labor Council, the proposals
revolved around relatively loose federations of state labour
councils, upon which representation for the congresses themselves
was largely based.17 However, as large national unions began to
emerge, they favoured a more centralised national organisation
based on direct union representation. Hence, a rival Australian
Labour Federation was formed representing large unions in 1914,
but it was unsuccessful in gaining full commitment from its
members and soon faded from view.18
From about 1915 the issue of union federation became
subsumed in notions of closer organisation in the One Big Union
Movement. The OBU broadened the basis of support for the
ideas of the radical syndicalist IWW (Industrial Workers of the
World), which had advocated the complete federation of all
unions in one large organisation which lowered all craft and
occupational barriers.19 From 1916 the Labor Council became the
major exponent of the OBU, and the 1918 Interstate Congress
organised, and dominated, by it in Sydney was preoccupied with
this issue, as were the succeeding All-Australian Trades Union
Congresses. The Labor Council's secretary, Jock Garden, became
secretary of the OBU's Organising and Propaganda Committee at
the 1918 congress, which also adopted the Council's IWW-based
preamble committing it to class struggle, in preference to the
AWU's more moderate version.20 The OBU scheme was again
5

endorsed at the 1919 congress, and the subsequent congresses of
1921-2 took organisational steps in this direction, particularly
w ith the establishm ent of the Commonwealth Council of
A ctio n .21 However, opposition to the OBU emerged at the
federal and NSW ALP conferences from 1919, and from
moderate unions, especially the AWU. The refusal of the
Commonwealth Industrial Registrar to register the OBU in 1924
marked the effective defeat of this movement.22
Nevertheless, when the ACTU was formed in 1927 it was
largely as a result of the Labor Council's momentum in this area.
In July 1925 the Labor Council, in association with the Melbourne
Trades Hall Council, organised a meeting of labour council
delegates from all states in Adelaide. This formed the
Com m onwealth Industrial Disputes Committee to control
disputes referred to it by the labour councils.23 Although this
com m ittee was never active, the momentum for national
organisation persisted with a further conference of state labour
councils in 1926, to support the 44 hour week and oppose the
federal government's legislation for increasing its own industrial
powers. The latter was supported by the federal parliamentary
Labor Party and the Commonwealth Council of Federated
Unions (CCFU), which had been formed in 1923 by moderate
unions disillusioned with the OBU, mainly based in Victoria.
Hence, the labour councils' activities were partly designed to
prevent losing the initiative to a national federation based on
unions rather than state councils. The labour councils then
asserted themselves further through the Commonwealth Council
of Action, which called the third All-Australian Trade Union
Congress of 1926.24 Held in Sydney, it was dominated by the
Labor Council of NSW, numerically and in terms of initiative. It
unanimously adopted Garden's motion for the formation of a
permanent central organisation at the national level, based on an
annual congress. Garden was also elected to the committee of five
6

charged with organising a further congress in 1927. This was dulyheld in Melbourne to form the ACTU.25
The Labor Council of NSW had a major impact on the nature
of the ACTU, since its constitution was based largely on NSW
proposals, with Garden playing a leading role in this area. The
ACTU's objective for 'the socialization of industry', and its
prim ary 'constitutional method' of supplanting craft with
industrial unionism,26 indicated the continuing influence of the
OBU, principally via the Labor Council. A major structural
presence was also given the state labour councils. They became
the state branches of the ACTU, with power of veto over
congress decisions until 1947, and with majority representation
on the executive until 1957.27 In 1927-30 the ACTU's affiliation
to the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, which was effectively
a branch of the Moscow-based Red International of Labour
Unions, was a result of Labor Council influence.28
MEMBERSHIP

In terms of membership, the Labor Council of NSW has remained
by far the most important of the ACTU's state branches since
1927. This has occurred for two reasons. First, NSW has a large
number of unionists, largely because it has been the most
populous state in Australia throughout the twentieth century, and
one of the two most industrialised states. Since unions
trad itionally have experienced greatest concentration in
secondary industry, this has enabled unions to achieve a density
of membership in excess of the Australian average throughout this
century also, with the minor exceptions of the 1930s depression
and 1949-50. Table 1 shows that from 1912 to 1922 and in the
1940s this excess varied between 8 and 18 percentage points,
although it became more marginal (never above 6 per centage
points) from the 1950s, and by the 1990s had virtually
7

disappeared.
Secondly, in comparison with other state bodies, the Labor
Council has been able to achieve a relatively high proportion of
affiliations from amongst those unions organising in the state for
most of its history. The main exception was in the 1920s and
early 1930s, although ironically, as we have seen, this period was
one of the most nationally influential for the NSW Labor
Council.29 From 1901, even prior to extending its jurisdicton from
Sydney to the state as a whole in 1908, it has never faced a
serious rival for the status of premier union organisation in the
state. Although the AWU was a significant omission from the
Council's affiliates for much of the first half of the century, it was
never as important a union in NSW as it has been in Queensland,
and so, never the genuine rival it was for the Brisbane TLC. Nor
did the NSW Labor Council ever endure a major split of the kind
which occurred in Victoria and took a third of that state's unions
and half of its unionists outside the jurisdiction of the Victorian
Trades Hall Council, to form a rival power centre from 196773.30
It is impossible to directly compare ACTU and Labor Council
membership because of different jurisdictions and lack of reliable
statistics for either organisation. Two general points, however,
may be made. First, the proportion of unionists which each peak
council covered in their respective jurisdictions appears to have
been similar from the 1950s, as it slowly rose from about 65 per
cent, but since NSW was more densely unionised throughout this
period, the Labor Council actually enjoyed a stronger membership
base. Secondly, unlike the ACTU, no major union remained
unaffiliated to the Labor Council after the late 1930s, including
the AWU which did not affiliate to the ACTU until 1967 31

Table 1

Year
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953

Unionised Proportion of Total W orkforce, N SW and
Com m onwealth, 1912-1994
NSW%
43
51
52
53
55
55
52
55
56
55
55
49
48
53
55
58
57
56
54
49
48
45
45
44
44
46
46
47
47
50
50
56
57
56
61
64
66
55
57
60
61
61

C'wth %
31
34
35
36
36
35
37
40
46
47
46
44
45
47
47
51
51
51
51
50
50
47
46
45
44
45
44
45
46
47
47
44
44
44
50
56
58
58
59
60
56
59

Year
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995

NSW%

C'wth %

65
63
63
62
61
60
60
59
57
57
56
56
54
54
53
53
52
56
56
57
59
59
58
57
58
57
59
59
60
59
58
53(60)
52(58)
53(59)
49(57)
50(58)
49(57)
51(58)
48(54)
46(52)

61
60
58
58
57
58
58
56
56
56
55
54
52
51
51
50
50
51
52
53
55
56
56
55
55
56
57
56
57
55
55
57
50(55)
49(55)
48(54)
47(541
48(54)
50(55)
47(53)
46(51)

New
NSW
48(57)
48(55)
45(51)
43(48)
40(46)
37(43)

New
C’with
46(52)
47(53)
44(49)
43(47)
38(44)
35(40)

Sources: Commonwealth Labour Reports, Commonwealth Yearbook,
and ABS Trade Union Statistics from 1974. Figures from 1985 are for
financial members, with total members in brackets.
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By the 1980s the Labor Council of NSW accounted for almost
40 per cent of total ACTU membership.32 From the mid-1970s its
affiliated membership had grown dramatically because of the
upsurge in white collar and public sector unionism. Many of these
remained outside the Labor Council and ACTU at that point,
and were affiliated to their own national peak organisations, the
Australian Council of Salaried and Professional Associations
(ACSPA) and the Council of Australian Government Employee
Organisations (CAGEO). However, ACSPA merged with the
ACTU in 1979, and CAGEO followed suit in 1981. ACTU rules
for affiliation of national unions required that they affiliate also
with at least one of its state branches. Virtually all of the
previously unaffiliated ACSPA and CAGEO unions joined the
Labor Council of NSW first, and in some cases, only that state
branch of the ACTU.
By 1983, two years after the ACTU’s absorption of ACSPA
and CAGEO, the proportion of unionists in unions affiliated to
the ACTU and Labor Council of NSW in their separate
jurisdictions was 89 and 96 per cent respectively. The NSW
Labor Council figure was 5 per cent higher than for the Victorian
Trades Hall Council, and much higher than for other state labour
councils. (The Western Australian Trades and Labour Council
enjoyed the third highest affiliated membership, with 74 per
cent).33 By 1989, when the number of Labor Council affiliates
reached an all-time record of 132, even though the total number of
unions declined as a result of amalgamations, there was no union
of any significance that remained unaffiliated to the Labor
Council, in contrast to other state labour councils.34 Most
significantly, the proportion of unionists in organisations
affiliated to the ACTU was also lower in other states.35 This
suggests that the Labor Council of NSW has actually boosted the
level of ACTU affiliated membership since the early 1980s.
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Recent disaffiliations from both peak councils are too recent to
suggest any significant trends. The secession of the TWU from the
ACTU, whilst remaining affiliated to the Labor Council, and the
secession of the Australian Manufacturing W orkers Union
(formerly the Metalworkers) from the Labor Council, whilst
remaining affiliated to the ACTU, appear to be isolated events. In
any case, the respective gains and losses are even.
INDUSTRIAL ROLE

The long term numerical strength and representativeness of the
Labor Council has assisted it in developing a significant
industrial role in the state, which has usually surpassed that of
the ACTU at a national level. Historically, the ACTU has played
a very limited role in control of strikes, or intervention in their
settlement. Despite the post Second World War growth in
intervention by the ACTU in some key national industries, it was
not until the era of the Hawke presidency that the ACTU began
to regularly intervene in industrial disputes. Since then, this role
has been confirm ed and even expanded by the special
circumstances of wage indexation and the Accord.
The Labor Council, in contrast, has frequently been in a
position to exert a high degree of control over disputes, and been
willing to do so, with peaks of control in the 1880s and early
1890s, during the special circumstances of the First and Second
World Wars, and from the 1940s through to the mid-1960s.36 For
most of this century the Labor Council has preferred to avoid
industrial action where possible, particularly when it is likely to
electorally damage the Labor Party, but even during the period of
the ascendancy of the right in the Council's leadership, after the
Second World War, this did not necessarily mean a total rejection
of the strike weapon. The Council was willing to co-ordinate
industrial campaigns on a number of occasions, such as for eight
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hours in the 1870s, 1970s and 1980s. Nor did the Council's
officers necessarily exert control over industrial action from the
centre; the Building Trades Group of Council traditionally
managed its own affairs in a relatively autonomous manner, even
though it usually included some militant unions, because it was
generally self-reliant, rarely embroiled other unions in its troubles,
and usually applied the strike weapon judiciously.37
The reason that the Labor Council could function with a
relatively high degree of control over disputes, notwithstanding a
constitution which, like the ACTU's, gave it limited formal
authority in this area, was that affiliates were w illing to
acknowledge Council authority in this way. ACTU intervention in
disputes, such as it has been, has also relied on this informal
concession of authority by affiliates. However, the degree of this
concession seems to have been greater over time with the Labor
Council, which has also been willing to more forcefully exert its
authority in those peak periods described above than the ACTU
has generally been able to do.
Historically, even if the ACTU did intervene in a dispute, it
usually did so through one of its state branches, i.e. the labour
councils, because they were their agents 'on the ground’. Limited
staff and resources, together with the ’tyranny of distance’ if a
dispute occurred outside Victoria, placed great restrictions upon
the ability of the Melbourne-based ACTU to intervene in many
disputes until well after the Second World War. Even with
modern improvements in transport and communications since
then, and with more recent improvements in the staff resources of
the ACTU, it is not equipped for regular intervention in a wide
range of disputes beyond those of special national significance. It
still must function largely through the labour councils because
these state branches are usually closer to the parties involved.
This role is underwritten in legislation for the Labor Council of
NSW, in a way which federal legislation does not provide for the
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ACTU. An amendment to the state Industrial Arbitration Act in
1981 gave the Labor Council the right to appear in all disputes
before the Industrial Commission, and this clause was retained in
the new Industrial Relations Act of 1991.38
The importance of the NSW industrial system within a dual
system of arbitration in the Australian federal framework also
fostered an important industrial role for the Labor Council. A
significant majority of NSW workers have always been covered
by state awards. The NSW arbitration system was the first to
become effective in Australia, and it arguably remained more
important than the federal system for many years for NSW
workers, even after the 1907 Harvester judgment which created
the basic wage system. NSW established its own basic wage
system in 1914, before the federal system covered many workers
at all, and the NSW basic wage continued after the abolition of
the federal basic wage system in 1967. The Labor Council has
enjoyed a major role in submission of general wage cases and
some other test cases before the state Industrial Commission, in
much the same way as the ACTU has before the federal tribunal.
Automatic quarterly cost of living adjustments to the state basic
wage (as with its federal counterpart) reduced this role somewhat
from 1920-64, but it is noteworthy that this role was enhanced
from 1964-74 because of the coincidence of the abolition of
autom atic quarterly cost of living adjustm ents and the
continuation of the basic wage at the NSW level.
This role continued even as the system became more
centralised from the mid-1970s. When the federal commission
adopted its wage indexation guidelines in 1975, the state
commission did also, but it did vary federal decisions slightly,
and wage increases were not automatic. After the abandonment
of wage indexation in 1981, the Labor Council continued to
present a state wage case, even after 1983, when the federal
commission, followed by its state counterparts, adopted a new
13

centralised system based upon the Accord.39 In the past, and still
even in recent times, it has been responsible for a small number of
test cases which have pioneered union gains through the federal
and other state systems. The most recent example was the case
which extended family leave entitlements to gay couples.
RESOURCES

The Labor Council of NSW has always had a greater level of
resources than the ACTU. The Council had a full-time secretary
from the beginning of the 20th century, and a full-time assistant
secretary in 1938, five years before the ACTU's first full-time
secretary. The ACTU's second full-time officer, its president, was
not appointed until 1949. Further extensions to the ACTU's
specialist staff did not occur until 1967, with three additions,
followed by a further three over the next four years.40 By the
early 1970s however, the NSW Labor Council had also embarked
on a significant expansion in its own specialist staff, which grew
from three to thirteen to 1983. This staff continued to grow during
the 1980s, but in that decade the ACTU's staff also expanded
rapidly. By 1996 the ACTU staff of 38 was slightly more than
twice that of the Labor Council.41 This ratio corresponded with
the respective affiliated memberships of both organisations.
The considerable growth in ACTU and Labor Council staff of
the 1980s and 1990s was partly due to the growth in income
generated by a higher level of affiliations and of per capita fees
paid by affiliates. It was also dependent upon Labor government
support for specific programs, particularly in the case of the
ACTU, since the Labor Council lived with a non-sympathetic
Liberal/National State government from 1988 to 1994. However,
as the Labor Council discovered in that period, resources
dependent upon political largesse are unreliable, and its number
of officers actually declined for a period under non-Labor rule. To
14

the extent that ACTU staff resources depend upon the
continuation of a federal Labor government, they indicate a
potential weakness.
The greatest resource advantage, however, which is enjoyed by
the Labor Council of NSW is a result of historical accident;
namely the 1925 decision to establish the first labour radio
station in the world, 2KY. Through its generation of advertising
revenue this investment has always given the Labor Council a
level of financial security independent of its income from
affiliation fees. The income from 2KY grew dramatically as a
result of secretary Barrie Unsworth's securing of the TAB contract
to broadcast races. By the early 1990s this income alone was
worth $2 million to the Council, funding many of its expanded
activities.42
POLITICAL ROLE

However, the single most important factor which has shaped the
significance of the Labor Council has been its special relationship
with the state branch of the Australian Labor Party (ALP), which
has enjoyed more electoral success than any other branch of the
Party. The Labor Council formed the Labor Party in 1891, and in
that same year the Party achieved the balance of parliamentary
power in the first election that it contested. Although there is
some debate as to which state branch of the Party was formed
first - NSW, Queensland or South Australia - the NSW Party
clearly achieved the first significant parliamentary presence. In
1910 the NSW branch formed the first full majority state ALP
government, in the same year that it achieved this success at the
national level for the first time, relying on NSW seats to a
significant extent. Since 1910 the ALP in NSW has been in
government for 47 of 85 years, or 55 per cent of the time,
including an unbroken quarter of a century of office from 1941 to
15

1965. Although the Labor Council lost direct control of the ALP
at an early stage in the 1890s, it has maintained a close
relationship with the ALP's NSW branch. Since the early 1900s a
high proportion of the Labor Council's affiliates have been
affiliated to the ALP, with union delegates usually accounting for
60 per cent of the total at state ALP conferences. Through the
support that it could muster at conferences, the Labor Council
has consistently enjoyed representation on the Party executive
and a significant influence on Party policy, especially regarding
industrial matters. From the 1940s the major mechanism for this
influence was the ALP's industrial committee, which essentially
prepared the ALP's legislative agendas. Labor Council officers
traditionally dominated this committee, to such an extent in the
1950s and 1960s that newspaper reporters often failed to
distinguish between it and the Council's executive.43
This situation has provided the Labor Council with
tremendous opportunities to influence industrial legislation, since
under the federal constitution most industrial powers have
resided with the states, rather than the Commonwealth.
Improvements in industrial conditions through legislation,
therefore, have been usually instigated by state ALP governments.
The electoral success of the NSW branch of the ALP has given it
the greatest opportunities in this way, opportunities which NSW
governments of the ALP have usually grasped, under the
influence of the Labor Council.
The best example of how this has worked to the benefit of all
Australian workers has been with the general reduction in
working hours. The first workers to achieve the 48 hour working
week (or 8 hour day, six days per week) were building tradesmen
in Melbourne and Sydney in the 1850s, as a result of union
action.44 Subsequently, the first extension of this 'boon' was to
metal tradesmen in Sydney in the 1870s, as a result of an
industrial campaign organised by the Labor Council.45 For the
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next fifteen years the Council and individual unions attempted by
industrial action to extend the eight hour day to a number of
other trades, but with limited or temporary success, because few
other unions wielded the strategic bargaining power of the
building and metal tradesmen.46 From an early stage, therefore,
the Council sought to overcome these weaknesses with general
legislation through the Labor Party. The first general legislative
reduction, to a 44 hour week, was introduced by the Storey ALP
government in 1920. The gain was initially shortlived, because of
repeal by a Nationalist government, and after its reintroduction
by the Lang ALP government in 1925 it was repealed again. Lang
permanently restored the 44 hour week in 1930. In 1947 the 40
hour week was also first introduced by an ALP government in
NSW (followed soon afterwards by the Queensland ALP
government). In both cases the state legislation provided an
important base from which the ACTU was able to generalise
reduced hours through the Commonwealth Arbitration Court (as
it then was), with the NSW government intervening in that Court's
proceedings on behalf of the unions.47
Although further reductions in working hours in the 1970s and
1980s occurred on an industry or occupational, rather than
general basis, the NSW Labor Council provided the main
leadership, in the public and private sectors.48 In 1957 the ACTU
Congress adopted the 35 hour week as its policy, targeting the
coal and power generation industries as the best points at which
to start. The first breakthrough for reduced hours came when the
state Labor government granted a 37 and a half hour week to
NSW miners, as a result of Labor Council and mining unions'
pressure. However, after the failure of a 35 hour claim before the
Coal Industry Tribunal in 1960, little was done to implement the
35 hours policy for some years, despite its consistent
reaffirm ation at subsequent Congresses. Again, in 1965 the
ACTU reaffirmed its policy as a matter of priority, but with little
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more impact than before. However, it was significant in 1965 that
the ACTU Congress ceded titular, as well as effective, leadership
of the campaign to its state branches, with particular reference to
the Labor Council of NSW. The main focus from 1969 became the
NSW Electricity Commission, where the Labor Council led a
campaign involving negotiations, Industrial Commission hearings
and industrial action for the next ten years. Finally, in 1979 a 38
hour w eek was achieved. From 1980-7 this gain spread
throughout the NSW public sector, on an individual departmental
or authority basis, as the result of negotiations led by the Labor
Council. Most NSW public servants had reduced working hours
by 1985.
A major momentum for generalisation of the 38 hour week
occurred as a result of these breakthoughs in the NSW public
sector, arising out of Labor Council pressure on the then state
ALP government. In the private sector the wharf labourers and
coal m iners had gained 35 hours in 1970-1 by collective
bargaining, with the assistance of the ACTU. But their cases were
exceptional and by their nature did not flow on to other
industries. Sporadic action in the oil industry at this time, co
ordinated by the ACTU, failed to gain reduced hours. However,
soon after the breakthrough in the Electricity Commission, the
Labor Council's intervention during strike action in the brewing
industry achieved a 35 hour week as part of a package involving
technological change. At that point the Metal Workers' Union
instigated a concerted campaign for the 35 hour week on a plantby-plant basis, initially with the participation of all unions in the
Metal Trades Federation, and with the support of the ACTU.
However, after the federal Arbitration Commission threatened to
withhold wage increases tinder the wage indexation system then
operating, the ACTU and a number of metal unions withdrew
from the campaign for a time. Nevertheless, the Metal Workers
persisted, achieving reductions on a plant-by-plant basis,
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especially after the collapse of wage indexation in 1981. From
1981 the Labor Council regained leadership of the general
reduced hours campaign, organising stopwork rallies, and co
ordinating or leading the negotiations in a number of significant
cases, including CSR chemicals (36-hour week), Hunter Valley
construction sites, and ship building and repair. The public and
private sector campaigns of the Labor Council and the Metal
Workers' Union were able to feed off each other for the remainder
of the 1980s, usually under the jurisdiction of the federal
A rbitration Commission, which adopted a 38 hour week
standard, based on productivity trade-offs on an industry or
plant basis. Indeed, by 1983 a majority of the workforce already
enjoyed the 38 hour week.49
The Labor Council also led the way in the continual extension
of annual leave for Australian workers, through a similar process
to that which had gained the earlier (pre-38 hours) reductions in
working hours. In 1944 the ALP government of NSW legislated to
extend annual leave for workers under state awards from one to
two weeks, and in December 1945 this flowed on to pace-setting
printers and metal workers under federal awards, from whence it
eventually spread further when the Commonwealth Arbitration
Court adopted this as a general standard. The state government
then legislated for three weeks annual leave in 1958, and the
Commonwealth Commission (as the Court had become) extended
the NSW gain to federal awards in 1963. Following this, the NSW
Labor government granted four weeks annual leave to state
employees in 1964, only four years after the Labor Council had
originally endorsed this demand, but only three years after the
Commonwealth Arbitration Commission had originally rejected
three weeks leave, and ten years before four weeks annual leave
was generalised throughout the rest of Australia by other ALP
governments and finally, by the Commonwealth Arbitration
Commission.50
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NSW Labor governments, prodded on by the Labor Council,
initiated industrial reforms in a number of other areas. Long
service leave was first introduced in NSW by legislation in 1951
and 1955. A fter further im provem ents in 1963, the
Commonwealth Arbitration Commission granted long service
leave in federal awards, again after intervention by the NSW
Labor government in support of an ACTU submission.51
The issue of equal pay motivated the Labor Council at an
early stage, well before the ACTU became involved in this
campaign. As early as 1924 the Labor Council resolved support
for a uniform basic wage for men and women. Four years later it
placed an organiser at the disposal of the Militant Women's
Group to assist it in organising women workers and campaigning
for equal pay for equal work.52 In 1937 Council affiliates formed
the Council of Action for Equal Pay, and it continued to lobby
over the issue during the second world war. During the war the
ACTU held a number of union conferences and began lobbying for
equal pay, largely as a result of its affiliates fearing the
permanent displacement of male members by cheaper female
workers who maintained industrial output during the absence of
the men in the armed forces.53 After the war, the issue subsided
for a time as troops returned to displace women from the
wartime factories, and the unions engaged in long campaigns for
basic wage and margins increases and reduced working hours.
It was the Labor Council which revived the equal pay
campaign from 1949. In 1950 it successfully persuaded the state
government to legislate to equalise the state female basic wage
with the higher federal version, which had been increased to 75
per cent of the male basic wage. For a time thereafter, the Labor
Council was more concerned with a major margins case, but from
1956, it revived the equal pay campaign. In 1957 the Labor
Council called on the ACTU to organise a national conference
and lobby government over the issue.54 Its equal pay committee,
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formed at this time, requested the ACTU 'in all future wage
claims to incorporate the common basic wage irrespective of
s e x '.55 Largely as a result of Council lobbying, the NSW
government in 1958 legislated again to prevent the Industrial
Commission from absorbing margins into the higher female basic
wage, and required the Commission to provide equal pay for
work 'of a like nature and of equal value' in the marginal or
secondary portion of women's wages. A year later the female
basic wage was increased to 80 per cent of the male rate, and
thereafter, was to be increased by 5 per cent per annum, until
equal to males in 1963. However, equal pay was not applicable
to predominantly female work, where most women worked.56
Pressure mounted for full equal pay in the early 1960s,
particularly from the Teachers' Federation. Yet, NSW took a
backwards step in 1964, when it equalised the state basic wage
with the federal version, which then involved a downwards
movement for the female basic wage.57 By 1969 only about 14 per
cent of those women under state awards had gained equal pay.
Although this was a somewhat higher proportion than in
Australia as a whole, it represented a failure on the part of the
Labor Council and the state government. By the end of the 1960s
the main focus for achieving equal pay was at the federal level.58
In all of these areas, the NSW labour movement, led by the
Labor Council, became the pacesetter for industrial gains for the
rest of Australia. Apart from the limited successes in the area of
equal pay, these gains were some of the greatest on the industrial
front in the history of the labour movement, and in many respects
NSW labour led the world in its industrial achievements.
RELATIVE AUTONOMY OF THE LABOR COUNCIL OF NSW

Because of its size, high level of resources, and the dual nature of
the federal structure of industrial relations in Australia, the Labor
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Council has also operated with a high degree of autonomy from
the ACTU in practice. It is inconceivable that it would follow the
recent example of the Queensland Trades and labor Council in
adopting the title of 'Queensland Branch of the ACTU'. The
’tyranny of distance’ contributed to NSW autonomy in early
times, of course. The location of the ACTU in Melbourne has
allowed the NSW Labor Council a larger degree of autonomy than
if it had been in Sydney, and its proximity to the ACTU may
have retarded the development of a stronger Victorian Trades
Hall Council. But in itself this is insufficient explanation, for other
state labour councils even more distant from Melbourne did not
develop the same degree of autonomy. The continuation of the
Labor Council’s autonomy since the improvements in modern
transport and communications, indicate more complex trends.
With the institutional concentration of the national offices of
many unions, together with the federal industrial commission and
the m ajor national peak employer councils all based in
Melbourne, a partial institutional vacuum was left at the state
level of union leadership to be filled by labour councils. The NSW
Labor Council had the critical mass in terms of affiliated
membership, and the institutional framework through the NSW
arbitration system, to develop a virtually rival centre of union
power and leadership. Underlying all of this, it appears that the
ambiguous relationship between the two bodies encompasses a
degree of Sydney-Melbourne rivalry, which permeates so many
institutional relationships in Australia.
Ideology and factional loyalties often provided a broader
motivation for autonomy than merely state loyalties. In the 1920s
and for much of the 1930s the Labor Council was under the
radical and m ilitant leadership of ’Jo ck ’ Garden and his
associates, w hereas the ACTU was dom inated by more
conservative national and Melbourne-based unions.59 Conversely,
by the 1970s a right-wing Labor Council leadership faced a
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centre-left dom ination of the ACTU.60 Under all of these
circumstances, the NSW Labor Council has never achieved
dominance of the ACTU leadership, nor even provided a
president or secretary. The only break in recruitment for these
positions from Melbourne-based union officials occurred when
Cliff Dolan was president from 1981-5, and although he had been
a Labor Council delegate years before, he had long since ceased to
play an active role on the Labor Council. Indeed, for most of the
period from the late 1960s to the early 1990s, it is notable that
the senior labour council secretary in the country did not hold the
senior vice-presidency of the ACTU.61 On the other hand, the
importance of the Labor Council meant that the ACTU could not
fail to consult with its leadership before taking major decisions.
The attraction of this situation for the Labor Council was that,
since its officers were not bound by decisions reached by the
ACTU's inner circle of leadership, of which it was generally not
part, its ability to operate independently was accordingly
increased.62
PRESENT AND FUTURE

The argument for the future significance of the NSW Labor
Council must by its nature be more speculative than the historical
record. There has been a continuous trend for the enhancement of
the status and authority of the ACTU since the time of the
Hawke presidency, with a significant intensification of this
process from the time of the Prices and Incomes Accord in 1983,
and its various new versions. Much of this enhancement of the
ACTU's status and authority has been on an informal basis. But
there is no doubt that its affiliates, which represent virtually all
unions in the country, employers, government and the Australian
Industrial Relations Commission (as it became in 1988) have
ceded this authority in the last twelve years.
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Since 1988 there has also been an unmistakable shift in the
balance of industrial powers from the state to the federal sphere,
which will tend to reduce the importance of state government
industrial legislation. This has been based on more expansive
High Court interpretations of the Commonwealth corporations
and external affairs powers under the constitution, which have
allowed the federal government to intervene more directly in
industrial matters, over, for example, unfair dismissals and
minimum standards for enterprise bargaining.63 This, together
with the longest period of federal ALP government in Australian
history, means that the ACTU has come to wield the type of
influence at a national level that the Labor Council has long
wielded at state level with ALP governments. Indeed, given the
precedence that federal industrial legislation now appears to take
over state legislation, the ACTU might be seen by some as
supplanting the Labor Council's role.
N evertheless, a number of current trends in Australian
industrial relations suggest that the foundations for the ACTU's
enhanced industrial status may only be of a temporary nature.64
Politically, the ACTU will always have an important role of
consultation with government, particularly Labor governments.
However, the specially influential role which it now enjoys will
inevitably be diminished greatly when the ALP eventually suffers
electoral defeat at the national level. At the same time, the Labor
Council's role of influence in government has just been rejuvenated
with the return of an ALP government in NSW. One aspect of the
shift of influence to the national level had been the absence of
ALP government in NSW over the past eight years. The ACTU
and federal ALP have a long way to go before they can equal the
long term relationship between the NSW Labor Council and ALP,
and its consequent impact on government.
Nor is the shift of the balance of legislative power in industrial
matters to the federal sphere as total or as settled as some
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commentators have suggested. The corporations power under the
constitution is subject to various limitations which limit federal
jurisdiction to corporations, interstate trade or commerce,
Commonwealth Territories, or parties to contracts with the
Com m onwealth or its agents. The main im pact of these
limitations would be to remove much of small business from
federal jurisdiction. Furthermore, in the application of ILO
conventions under its external affairs powers, the federal
government may be principally involved with establishing
minimum, rather than absolute, standards. If this is the case,
state legislation would need to equal the federal provisions, but
may improve upon it. There are clear indications that the current
federal and NSW governments interpret the situation in this
w a y 65, but it is too early to ascertain how permanent this
interpretation is, especially without being able to predict the
impact of a change of government.
More substantially, the widespread change in the structure
and operation of Australian unionism, much of which has
actually been instigated by the ACTU, is likely to diminish its
direct industrial role. The decentralisation of the industrial
relations system and the encouragement of enterprise level
bargaining have removed the most important industrial role
historically performed by the ACTU: namely, the presentation of
union submissions for national wage cases. There does not
appear to be a major role to replace this. True, the ACTU remains
important in managing industrial campaigns and settling disputes
in some key industries, and to some extent it has attempted to
co-ordinate enterprise bargaining. But its ability to perform this
co-ordinating role is limited at the national level, especially given
the relatively limited resources available to the ACTU for this
purpose. To the extent that the ACTU does co-ordinate
industrial activity it relies heavily on its state branches, the labour
councils. The NSW Council itself has a substantial portfolio of
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significant industries and firms for which it co-ordinates
bargaining. It is a role which has emerged strongly for the Labor
Council since the late 1970s, when it attempted to standardise
the terms of a relatively large number of redundancy agreements
negotiated at the time.66 Recent successes of the South Coast
Labour Council in NSW in negotiating agreements to govern major
new construction projects, also indicates the potential for
provincial labour councils in this area.67 Labour councils at the
state or provincial level have the advantage over the ACTU of
being closer to their constituents and 'the coalface', of having
longer experience at this level, and in the case of the state bodies
at least, of having greater resources at this level.
The ACTU's strategy for the creation of 20 large super unions,
which is proceeding apace, also has negative implications for the
future industrial role of the ACTU. Insofar as this policy achieves
success in concentrating union resource bases to facilitate
effective enterprise bargaining, the new super unions will be far
more self-reliant and less likely to rely upon co-ordination by the
ACTU. The recent unprecedented disaffiliation from the ACTU
by the TWU may be an indication of what the future holds in this
regard, although the disaffiliation of the AMWU from both the
NSW and South Coast labour councils indicates that peak bodies
could suffer at that level as well. Although it is too early to
predict with any certainty, the historical record would suggest
that both levels of disaffiliation are temporary. More importantly
in the long term, it is by no means clear that all of the super
unions will survive in their current form. M any recent
amalgamations are entirely impractical political marriages of
convenience, with little industrial rationale. In some cases the
amalgamated bodies continue to operate effectively as separate
unions, to the extent of opposing each other in tribunals in at
least one case.68 Since the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 has
reduced the minimum size of federally registered unions to 100
26

members, from the 1990 minimum of 10,000, which was intended
to encourage union amalgamations,69 it will be possible for new
smaller unions covering unorganised marginal groups (such as
a rtists70) to become registered. Something like this may be
necessary to arrest the decline of union membership which has
characterised the period of super unionism - larger unions
covering fewer workers - which are not perceived as relevant to
their needs by workers because of their bureaucratic m odus
operandi and a weak workplace or service-oriented presence. It is
extremely significant in this regard that the Labor Council of
NSW has been the foremost, virtually lone, critic of the ACTU's
amalgamation policy.71
CONCLUSIONS

If there is any serious challenge to the current trends in
restructuring, therefore, they will be based in the senior Labor
Council in this country, in NSW. Unlike other state bodies, the
Labor Council has the will to maintain an independent industrial
role which will be at least as important as that of the ACTU. This
is based on its historical achievements and expectations based
upon them, its stable relationship with a state branch of the ALP
which remains far more successful electorally than any other, its
far greater resource base than any other peak body in Australia,
including the ACTU, and the willingness of its leadership to
develop alternative visions of the nature of unionism in the future.
Historically, the Labor Council of NSW has been the main
instigator of industrial reform in Australia, operating with a high
degree of autonomy from the ACTU. The circumstances which
have enabled it to play that role - the strength of unionism in
NSW, the importance of the NSW industrial relations system and
its part in it, its close relationship with frequent state Labor
governments, and the farsighted decision to establish its own
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radio station - have all been important for the greater part of the
20th century, and continue to be so. In contrast, the special
circumstances which have increased the significance of the ACTU
in the past 20 years are too recent and unstable to say that it has
displaced the Labor Council yet.
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